Selfish routing on transportation networks with supply and demand constraints

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new non-atomic selfish routing game model for transportation networks that incorporates supply and demand constraints, offering a more realistic depiction of traffic flow and revealing new inefficiencies in equilibrium states.

Contribution

It develops a novel routing game model based on Daganzo's CTM with capacity constraints, and analyzes Wardrop equilibria and social optima within this framework.

Findings

Characterizes Wardrop equilibria and social optima.

Identifies inefficiency in partially transferring Wardrop equilibria.

Provides insights into traffic flow dynamics with supply-demand constraints.

Abstract

Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM). Each network link is characterized by a supply and demand mechanism that enforces capacity constraints based on current density, providing a more accurate representation of real-world traffic phenomena. We characterize the Wardrop equilibria and social optima of this game and identify a previously unrecognized inefficiency in selfish routing: partially transferring Wardrop equilibria, where only part of the exogenous flow traverses the network.