Protecting Cryptographic Libraries against Side-Channel and Code-Reuse Attacks
Rodothea Myrsini Tsoupidi, Elena Troubitsyna, and Panos Papadimitratos

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the security vulnerabilities of cryptographic libraries against side-channel and code-reuse attacks, proposing improvements to enhance their security measures.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive assessment of existing cryptographic libraries' security and suggests specific development process enhancements.
Findings
Identified key vulnerabilities in popular cryptographic libraries.
Highlighted gaps in current security measures.
Recommended security improvements for development practices.
Abstract
Cryptographic libraries, an essential part of cybersecurity, are shown to be susceptible to different types of attacks, including side-channel and memory-corruption attacks. In this article, we examine popular cryptographic libraries in terms of the security measures they implement, pinpoint security vulnerabilities, and suggest security improvements in their development process.
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