Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider

TL;DR
This paper develops efficient algorithms for a learning agent to optimize its payoff in general sum games against strategic opponents with unknown payoffs, using geometric analysis of menus.
Contribution
It introduces polynomial-time algorithms for optimal and near-optimal learning strategies in unknown opponent scenarios, extending to maximin objectives.
Findings
Efficient construction of asymptotically optimal no-regret algorithms.
Polynomial-time algorithms for epsilon-optimal strategies with constant game size.
Convergence guarantees for maximin objectives in polynomial time.
Abstract
We consider the problem of a learning agent who has to repeatedly play a general sum game against a strategic opponent who acts to maximize their own payoff by optimally responding against the learner's algorithm. The learning agent knows their own payoff function, but is uncertain about the payoff of their opponent (knowing only that it is drawn from some distribution ). What learning algorithm should the agent run in order to maximize their own total utility, either in expectation or in the worst-case over ? When the learning algorithm is constrained to be a no-regret algorithm, we demonstrate how to efficiently construct an optimal learning algorithm (asymptotically achieving the optimal utility) in polynomial time for both the in-expectation and worst-case problems, independent of any other assumptions. When the learning algorithm is not constrained to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInnovative Teaching and Learning Methods
