Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer

TL;DR
This paper introduces polynomial-time algorithms for computing equilibrium strategies in two-player turn-taking stochastic games with extensive-form correlation, advancing the efficiency and applicability of equilibrium computation methods.
Contribution
It presents the first polynomial-time algorithm for SEFCE with commitment in general stochastic games and an efficient approximation algorithm for EFCE that handles stochasticity, approximation, and succinct game representations.
Findings
First polynomial-time algorithm for SEFCE with commitment in stochastic games.
Efficient approximation algorithm for EFCE with optimality and low error dependency.
Algorithms work in succinct graph form, unlike previous tree-based methods.
Abstract
We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium (SEFCE), which runs in time polynomial in the size of the game, as well as the number of bits required to encode each input number. (2) We give an efficient algorithm for approximately computing an optimal extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) up to machine precision, i.e., the algorithm achieves approximation error in time polynomial in the size of the game, as well as . Our algorithm for SEFCE is the first polynomial-time algorithm for equilibrium computation with commitment in such a general class of stochastic games. Existing algorithms for SEFCE typically make stronger assumptions such as no chance moves, and…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Advanced Research in Systems and Signal Processing
