PoisonCatcher: Revealing and Identifying LDP Poisoning Attacks in IIoT

TL;DR

PoisonCatcher is a novel defense mechanism that detects LDP poisoning attacks in IIoT by analyzing temporal similarity, attribute correlation, and pattern stability, achieving over 90% F2 score in real-world tests.

Contribution

This paper reveals key attack modes in LDP-based IIoT data collection, formulates a general attack model, and proposes PoisonCatcher, a detection method leveraging multiple metrics for robust poisoning identification.

Findings

PoisonCatcher achieves F2 scores above 90.7% in real-world datasets.

LDP poisoning attacks distort statistical and inter-attribute correlations.

Adversaries find it difficult to maintain stealth while stabilizing poisoning actions.

Abstract

Local Differential Privacy (LDP), a robust privacy-protection model, is widely adopted in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) due to its lightweight, decentralized, and scalable. However, its perturbation-based privacy-protection mechanism hinders distinguishing between any two data, thereby facilitating LDP poisoning attacks. The exposed physical-layer vulnerabilities and resource-constrained prevalent at the IIoT edge not only facilitate such attacks but also render existing LDP poisoning defenses, all of which are deployed at the edge and rely on ample resources, impractical. This work proposes a LDP poisoning defense for IIoT in the resource-rich aggregator. We first reveal key poisoning attack modes occurring within the LDP-utilized IIoT data-collection process, detailing how IIoT vulnerabilities enable attacks, and then formulate a general attack model and derive the poisoned data's indistinguishability. This work subsequently analyzes the poisoning impacts on aggregated data based on industrial process correlation, revealing the distortion of statistical query results' temporal similarity and the resulting disruption of inter-attribute correlation, and uncovering the intriguing paradox that adversaries' attempts to stabilize their poisoning actions for stealth are difficult to maintain. Given these findings, we propose PoisonCatcher, a solution for identifying poisoned data, which includes time-series detectors based on temporal similarity, attribute correlation, and pattern stability metrics to detect poisoned attributes, and a latent-bias feature miner for identifying poisons. Experiments on the real-world dataset indicate that PoisonCatcher successfully identifies poisoned data, demonstrating robust identification capabilities with F2 scores above 90.7\% under various attack settings.