Aggregative games with bilevel structures: Distributed algorithms and convergence analysis

TL;DR

This paper develops distributed algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in complex bilevel aggregative games, involving second and first order gradient methods, with proven convergence and effectiveness demonstrated through simulations.

Contribution

It introduces novel distributed algorithms for bilevel aggregative games, including second order and first order gradient-based methods, with convergence analysis and practical simulation validation.

Findings

The second order algorithm converges asymptotically to Nash equilibrium.

The first order algorithm achieves linear convergence errors.

Simulations confirm the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of distributively seeking the equilibria of aggregative games with bilevel structures is studied. Different from the traditional aggregative games, here the aggregation is determined by the minimizer of a virtual leader's objective function in the inner level, which depends on the actions of the players in the outer level. Moreover, the global objective function of the virtual leader is formed by the sum of some local functions with two arguments, each of which is strongly convex with respect to the second argument. When making decisions, each player in the outer level only has access to a local part of the virtual leader's objective function. To handle this problem, first, we propose a second order gradient-based distributed algorithm, where the Hessian matrices associated with the objective functions of the leader are involved. By the algorithm, players update their actions while cooperatively minimizing the objective function of the virtual leader to estimate the aggregation by communicating with their neighbors via a connected graph. Under mild assumptions on the graph and cost functions, we prove that the actions of players asymptotically converge to the Nash equilibrium point. Then, for the case where the Hessian matrices associated with the objective functions of the virtual leader are not available, we propose a first order gradient-based distributed algorithm, where a distributed two-point estimate strategy is developed to estimate the gradients of players' cost functions in the outer level. Under the same conditions, we prove that the convergence errors of players' actions to the Nash equilibrium point are linear with respect to the estimate parameters. Finally, simulations are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of our theoretical results.