Fisheries Problems and Bureaucracy in Aquaculture Anti-Commons View

TL;DR

This paper examines how bureaucracy and anti-commons issues hinder aquaculture development, highlighting decision-making delays and property rights conflicts that lead to resource under-utilization in fisheries.

Contribution

It analyzes anti-commons problems in aquaculture, emphasizing the impact of multiple exclusion rights and proposing ways to address resource under-utilization.

Findings

Bureaucracy causes decision delays in fisheries projects.

Multiple exclusion rights lead to resource under-utilization.

Proposed solutions aim to improve decision efficiency.

Abstract

The problems raised by anti-commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan and Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a multitude of agents that have deciding power. At the view of conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or too many administrative circuits push for too late decisions, or for non-rational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents. Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an anti-commons problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned exclusion rights, which may be exercised. Anti-commons problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented.