Adaptive Manipulation for Coalitions in Knockout Tournaments
Juhi Chaudhary, Hendrik Molter, Meirav Zehavi

TL;DR
This paper introduces the concept of adaptive coalition manipulation in knockout tournaments, analyzing its computational complexity and providing algorithms for specific cases, highlighting the difficulty of manipulation in general.
Contribution
It is the first to incorporate adaptiveness into coalition manipulation in knockout tournaments and studies its computational complexity and algorithmic solutions.
Findings
Manipulation problem is hard for every class in the polynomial hierarchy.
Polynomial-time algorithm exists for constant coalition sizes.
Problem is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to coalition size and certain player set parameters.
Abstract
Knockout tournaments, also known as single-elimination or cup tournaments, are a popular form of sports competitions. In the standard probabilistic setting, for each pairing of players, one of the players wins the game with a certain (a priori known) probability. Due to their competitive nature, tournaments are prone to manipulation. We investigate the computational problem of determining whether, for a given tournament, a coalition has a manipulation strategy that increases the winning probability of a designated player above a given threshold. More precisely, in every round of the tournament, coalition players can strategically decide which games to throw based on the advancement of other players to the current round. We call this setting adaptive constructive coalition manipulation. To the best of our knowledge, while coalition manipulation has been studied in the literature, this is…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
