Efficient and Verified Continuous Double Auctions
Mohit Garg, Suneel Sarswat

TL;DR
This paper presents a highly efficient, formally verified implementation of continuous double auctions that significantly outperforms previous versions, enabling rapid processing of millions of orders and providing reliable error detection for market regulators.
Contribution
The authors develop an $O(n \, \log n)$ verified implementation of continuous double auctions using Coq, improving over the previous $O(n^2)$ version and establishing a matching lower bound.
Findings
Achieved $O(n \log n)$ matching time for $n$ orders
Reduced processing time for 10 million orders from days to minutes
Provided a verified implementation with formal correctness guarantees
Abstract
Continuous double auctions are commonly used to match orders at currency, stock, and commodities exchanges. A verified implementation of continuous double auctions is a useful tool for market regulators as they give rise to automated checkers that are guaranteed to detect errors in the trade logs of an existing exchange if they contain trades that violate the matching rules. We provide an efficient and formally verified implementation of continuous double auctions that takes time to match orders. This improves an earlier verified implementation. We also prove a matching lower bound on the running time for continuous double auctions. Our new implementation takes only a couple of minutes to run on ten million randomly generated orders as opposed to a few days taken by the earlier implementation. Our new implementation gives rise to an efficient…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Supply Chain and Inventory Management · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
