Poison Attacks and Adversarial Prompts Against an Informed University Virtual Assistant
Ivan A. Fernandez, Subash Neupane, Sudip Mittal, Shahram Rahimi

TL;DR
This paper investigates the vulnerability of university virtual assistants to poison attacks, demonstrating how adversaries can exploit security gaps to compromise system integrity and data security.
Contribution
It introduces a novel assessment of poison attack vulnerabilities on university chatbots, highlighting security risks in generative AI systems used in academic environments.
Findings
BarkPlug chatbot is susceptible to data poisoning attacks.
Adversarial prompts can grant unauthorized data access.
Security gaps enable potential exploitation of AI chatbots.
Abstract
Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) are particularly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Since the release of ChatGPT, various industries are adopting LLM-based chatbots and virtual assistants in their data workflows. The rapid development pace of AI-based systems is being driven by the potential of Generative AI (GenAI) to assist humans in decision making. The immense optimism behind GenAI often overshadows the adversarial risks associated with these technologies. A threat actor can use security gaps, poor safeguards, and limited data governance to carry out attacks that grant unauthorized access to the system and its data. As a proof-of-concept, we assess the performance of BarkPlug, the Mississippi State University chatbot, against data poison attacks from a red team perspective.
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Taxonomy
TopicsNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection · Security and Verification in Computing · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
