The Complexity of Tullock Contests
Yu He, Fan Yao, Yang Yu, Xiaoyun Qiu, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in general Tullock contests with heterogeneous contestants, revealing how elasticity parameters influence tractability and providing algorithms for different regimes.
Contribution
It characterizes the complexity of computing PNE in Tullock contests based on elasticity parameters and offers efficient algorithms and approximation schemes for various cases.
Findings
Polynomial-time algorithms for contests with few medium elasticity contestants.
NP-completeness results when the number of medium elasticity contestants exceeds logarithmic scale.
A Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for hard instances.
Abstract
Despite the extensive literature on Tullock contests, computational results for the general model with heterogeneous contestants remain scarce. This paper studies the algorithmic complexity of computing a pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) in such general Tullock contests. We find that the elasticity parameters {r_i}, which govern the returns to scale of contestants' production functions, play a decisive role in the problem's complexity. Our core conceptual insight is that the computational hardness is determined specifically by the number of contestants with medium elasticity (r_i \in (1, 2]). This is illustrated by a complete set of algorithmic results under two parameter regimes: -Efficient Regime: When the number of contestants with medium elasticity is logarithmically bounded by the total number of contestants (O(log n)), we provide an algorithm that determines the existence of a PNE…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic Theory and Institutions
