Beyond the Binary: Capturing Diverse Preferences With Reward Regularization
Vishakh Padmakumar, Chuanyang Jin, Hannah Rose Kirk, He He

TL;DR
This paper highlights the limitations of binary preference judgments in capturing diverse user preferences for LLMs and proposes a reward regularization method using synthetic preferences to better align models with real-world user diversity.
Contribution
It introduces a taxonomy of preference subjectivity and a regularization technique that incorporates synthetic preferences to improve reward models.
Findings
Reward models weakly correlate with user preferences in subjective cases.
Synthetic preference augmentation improves alignment with user preferences.
Regularization with synthetic preferences enhances reward model performance.
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via public-facing interfaces to interact with millions of users, each with diverse preferences. Despite this, preference tuning of LLMs predominantly relies on reward models trained using binary judgments where annotators select the preferred choice out of pairs of model outputs. In this work, we argue that this reliance on binary choices does not capture the broader, aggregate preferences of the target user in real-world tasks. We propose a taxonomy that identifies two dimensions of subjectivity where different users disagree on the preferred output-namely, the Plurality of Responses to Prompts, where prompts allow for multiple correct answers, and the Indistinguishability of Responses, where candidate outputs are paraphrases of each other. We show that reward models correlate weakly with user preferences in these cases. As a first…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems
MethodsALIGN
