EF2X Exists For Four Agents
Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa

TL;DR
This paper proves that EF2X allocations, a relaxed fairness criterion, always exist for four agents with cancelable valuations and provides algorithms for computing such allocations efficiently.
Contribution
It establishes the existence of EF2X allocations for four agents with cancelable valuations and offers a constructive, pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for their computation.
Findings
EF2X allocations guaranteed for four agents with cancelable valuations.
Polynomial-time algorithm for EF2X allocation among three agents.
Constructive proof with pseudopolynomial algorithm for four agents.
Abstract
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among a group of agents, aiming to limit the envy between any two agents. The central open problem in this literature, which has proven to be extremely challenging, is regarding the existence of an EFX allocation, i.e., an allocation such that any envy from some agent i toward another agent j would vanish if we were to remove any single good from the bundle allocated to j. When the agents' valuations are additive, which has been the main focus of prior works, Chaudhury et al. [2024] showed that an EFX allocation is guaranteed to exist for all instances involving up to three agents. Subsequently, Berger et al. [2022] extended this guarantee to nice-cancelable valuations and Akrami et al. [2023] to MMS-feasible valuations. However, the existence of EFX allocations for instances involving four agents remains open, even for additive…
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TopicsSpacecraft and Cryogenic Technologies
