Physical and Software Based Fault Injection Attacks Against TEEs in Mobile Devices: A Systemisation of Knowledge
Aaron Joy, Ben Soh, Zhi Zhang, Sri Parameswaran, Darshana, Jayasinghe

TL;DR
This survey reviews physical and software fault injection attacks on TEEs in mobile devices, highlighting vulnerabilities, real-world risks, and the need for stronger countermeasures to enhance security.
Contribution
It systematically analyzes FI techniques against TEEs, identifies security gaps, and provides actionable recommendations for improving TEE resilience in mobile systems.
Findings
EMFI can induce faults without hardware modifications
Real-world attacks can lead to privilege escalation
Current TEE architectures have significant vulnerabilities
Abstract
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are critical components of modern secure computing, providing isolated zones in processors to safeguard sensitive data and execute secure operations. Despite their importance, TEEs are increasingly vulnerable to fault injection (FI) attacks, including both physical methods, such as Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI), and software-based techniques. This survey examines these FI methodologies, exploring their ability to disrupt TEE operations and expose vulnerabilities in devices ranging from smartphones and IoT systems to cloud platforms. The study highlights the evolution and effectiveness of non-invasive techniques, such as EMFI, which induce faults through electromagnetic disturbances without physical modifications to hardware, making them harder to detect and mitigate. Real-world case studies illustrate the significant risks posed by these…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Malware Detection Techniques · Security and Verification in Computing · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
