To Be a Truster or Not to Be: Evolutionary Dynamics of a Symmetric N-Player Trust Game in Well-Mixed and Networked Populations
Ik Soo Lim, Naoki Masuda

TL;DR
This paper introduces a symmetric N-player Trust Game to study trust evolution, revealing that trust struggles to evolve in well-mixed populations but can be influenced by payoff structures and network topology in structured populations.
Contribution
It proposes a novel symmetric N-player Trust Game with role alternation and analyzes how payoff nonlinearity and network structure affect trust evolution.
Findings
Trust does not evolve in well-mixed populations regardless of payoff nonlinearity.
Nonlinear payoffs significantly impact trust evolution in structured populations.
Network topology influences the success of prosocial strategies in the game.
Abstract
Trust and reciprocation of it form the foundation of economic, social and other interactions. While the Trust Game is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e., investor and trustee), its extensions to multi-player scenarios have been restricted to instances where players assume only one role. We propose a symmetric N-player Trust Game, in which players alternate between two roles, and the payoff of the player is defined as the average across their two roles and drives the evolutionary game dynamics. We find that prosocial strategies are harder to evolve with the present symmetric N-player Trust Game than with the Public Goods Game, which is well studied. In particular, trust fails to evolve regardless of payoff function nonlinearity in well-mixed populations in the case of the symmetric N-player trust game. In…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
