Refuting the Metaphysics of Wolfram and Tegmark
Joseph Natal

TL;DR
This paper critically examines Wolfram's hypergraph physics and Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis, arguing that their philosophical assumptions about truth and reality are flawed, despite the potential of combinatorial structures for future physics.
Contribution
The paper challenges the philosophical foundations of Wolfram and Tegmark's theories, emphasizing the importance of clear notions of truth and the role of combinatorial structures in physics.
Findings
Wolfram's theory conflates potential and actual existence of mathematical truths.
Tegmark's MUH relies on gematria, a questionable proof of its claims.
Combinatorial structures like directed acyclic graphs are promising for future physics.
Abstract
Wolfram's hypergraph dynamics should replace outmoded models in physics. This should even more so be the case if experimental evidence for the theory is found (which I believe is probable). However, due to the breadth and depth of the theory, it may be difficult to produce experimental evidence which falsifies it. Some of Wolfram's personal work relating to his physics project is philosophical, and so mechanics of particular phenomena in the natural world can become a triviality or an aside. In other words, the general theory "casts a wide net", and it is the philosophical topics I will challenge. I find that Wolfram must adopt a radical epistemology through his so-called Observer Theory because there is no clear notion of Truth. Tegmark believes in an objective Truth, but I find its relation to the observer untenable, and the proof of his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) is…
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Taxonomy
TopicsHistorical, Literary, and Cultural Studies
