Direct Fractional Auction
Dmitriy Taubman, Boris Gleyzer, Ke Yang, Farhad Rassekh

TL;DR
This paper introduces the Direct Fractional Auction (DFA), an efficient market mechanism for fractional ownership of indivisible assets, enabling small and large investors to participate and optimizing seller value.
Contribution
It presents the DFA algorithm for fractional ownership auctions, including procedures for optimal bidder selection and complexity reduction techniques.
Findings
DFA outperforms Greedy algorithm in maximizing seller value
DFA effectively transfers partial ownership to winners
Pruning method reduces problem complexity
Abstract
This paper designs a market algorithm for fractional ownership of an indivisible asset. It provides an efficient market mechanism, named Direct Fractional Auction (DFA) that offers valuable assets to both small and large investors who can become partial owners of such assets. Additionally, it introduces procedures and algorithms with DFA to determine the optimal winning combinations of unaffiliated bidders. DFA, on the one hand, transfers the partial ownership to the winners and, on the other, redirects the proceeds from the auctions to the sellers. We show that the DFA algorithm works more efficiently than the Greedy algorithm in maximizing the seller's value. We also demonstrate the possibility of reducing the complexity of the problem using the "pruning" method for data pre-processing.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMerger and Competition Analysis · Supply Chain and Inventory Management
MethodsDirect Feedback Alignment
