The Conflict Graph Design: Estimating Causal Effects under Arbitrary Neighborhood Interference
Vardis Kandiros, Charilaos Pipis, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christopher Harshaw

TL;DR
This paper introduces the Conflict Graph Design, a novel method for constructing network experiment designs that accurately estimate causal effects under arbitrary neighborhood interference, using a conflict graph framework and a modified Horvitz--Thompson estimator.
Contribution
The paper proposes a general conflict graph approach for experimental design in network settings, providing new variance bounds and methods for estimating diverse causal effects.
Findings
Variance of estimator bounded by $O(rac{ ext{largest eigenvalue of conflict graph}}{n})$
Achieves best known rates for global and direct effects
Provides new methods for spill-over effects estimation
Abstract
A fundamental problem in network experiments is selecting an appropriate experimental design in order to precisely estimate a given causal effect of interest. In this work, we propose the Conflict Graph Design, a general approach for constructing experiment designs under network interference with the goal of precisely estimating a pre-specified causal effect. A central aspect of our approach is the notion of a conflict graph, which captures the fundamental unobservability associated with the causal effect and the underlying network. In order to estimate effects, we propose a modified Horvitz--Thompson estimator. We show that its variance under the Conflict Graph Design is bounded as , where is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the conflict graph. These rates depend on both the underlying network and the particular causal effect under…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFacility Location and Emergency Management · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Economic and Environmental Valuation
