Human game experiment to verify the equilibrium selection controlled by design

TL;DR

This study experimentally verifies that equilibrium selection in games can be influenced by game dynamics design, with human behavior aligning with evolutionary game theory predictions, demonstrating the potential for controlled equilibrium outcomes.

Contribution

It provides empirical evidence that manipulating game dynamics can steer equilibrium selection, bridging control theory and human strategic behavior.

Findings

Human strategies follow evolutionary game theory predictions

Cyclic patterns observed in strategy space

Convergence speed aligns with theoretical expectations

Abstract

We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate that human behavior consists with the predictions derived from evolutionary game theory paradigm. The consistency is supported by three key observations: (1) the long-term distribution of strategies in the strategy space, (2) the cyclic patterns observed within this space, and (3) the speed of convergence to the selected equilibrium. These findings suggest that the design of controllers aimed at equilibrium selection can indeed achieve their theoretical intended purpose. The location of this study in the knowledge tree of evolutionary game science is presented.