A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration
Chao Huang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a dynamic auction mechanism designed to facilitate multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities, ensuring stable outcomes when contracts are gross complements.
Contribution
It presents a novel dynamic auction framework that achieves stability in multilateral collaborations with gross complementarity among primitive contracts.
Findings
The auction guarantees stable outcomes in the specified setting.
It effectively handles primitive contracts with gross complementarity.
The mechanism promotes efficient multilateral collaboration.
Abstract
We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic auction that finds a stable outcome when primitive contracts are gross complements for all participants.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications
