Fundamental Limits of Routing Attack on Network Overload
Xinyu Wu, Eytan Modiano

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the threat of routing attacks on networks, developing algorithms to identify optimal attack strategies and assess overload risks, thereby aiding in network security and resilience.
Contribution
It introduces polynomial-time algorithms for optimal routing attack detection and approximation methods for overload maximization, advancing understanding of network vulnerability.
Findings
Optimal routing attack algorithms for multi-hop networks.
NP-hardness of maximizing throughput loss.
Heuristic algorithm for node hijacking selection.
Abstract
We quantify the threat of network adversaries to inducing \emph{network overload} through \emph{routing attacks}, where a subset of network nodes are hijacked by an adversary. We develop routing attacks on the hijacked nodes for two objectives related to overload: \emph{no-loss throughput minimization} and \emph{loss maximization}. The first objective attempts to identify a routing attack that minimizes the network's throughput that is guaranteed to survive. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm that can output the optimal routing attack in multi-hop networks with global information on the network's topology, and an algorithm with an approximation ratio of under partial information. The second objective attempts to maximize the throughput loss. We demonstrate that this problem is NP-hard, and develop two approximation algorithms with multiplicative and additive guarantees…
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Taxonomy
TopicsNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection · Cybersecurity and Information Systems · Software-Defined Networks and 5G
