A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation with a Fixed Number of Agents
Ryoga Mahara

TL;DR
This paper presents a polynomial-time algorithm for fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among a fixed number of agents, achieving EF1 and fractional Pareto optimality simultaneously.
Contribution
It introduces a novel sequential approach to compute EF1 and fPO allocations efficiently when the number of agents is fixed.
Findings
The algorithm runs in polynomial time for fixed number of agents.
It guarantees EF1 and fractional Pareto optimality simultaneously.
Addresses an open problem in fair division literature.
Abstract
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods, while Pareto optimality (PO) and its stronger variant, fractional Pareto optimality (fPO), are widely recognized efficiency criteria. Although each property is straightforward to achieve individually, simultaneously ensuring both fairness and efficiency is challenging. Caragiannis et al.~\cite{caragiannis2019unreasonable} established the surprising result that maximizing Nash social welfare yields an allocation that is both EF1 and PO; however, since maximizing Nash social welfare is NP-hard, this approach does not provide an efficient algorithm. To overcome this barrier, Barman, Krishnamurthy, and Vaish~\cite{barman2018finding} designed a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems · Game Theory and Applications
