Examining Attacks on Consensus and Incentive Systems in Proof-of-Work Blockchains: A Systematic Literature Review

TL;DR

This systematic review analyzes various attacks on Proof-of-Work blockchain consensus and incentive mechanisms, highlighting how attack combinations increase threats and proposing future design guidelines for mitigation.

Contribution

It provides a comprehensive analysis of individual and combined attacks on PoW blockchains and offers design guidelines to enhance security against these threats.

Findings

Attacks like selfish mining and block withholding can be combined for greater effectiveness.

Multiple mining pools attacking each other can impact their economic returns.

Understanding attack combinations is crucial for developing effective countermeasures.

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies have gained popularity due to their transparency, security, and accessibility compared to traditional financial systems, with Bitcoin, introduced in 2009, leading the market. Bitcoin's security relies on blockchain technology - a decentralized ledger consisting of a consensus and an incentive mechanism. The consensus mechanism, Proof of Work (PoW), requires miners to solve difficult cryptographic puzzles to add new blocks, while the incentive mechanism rewards them with newly minted bitcoins. However, as Bitcoin's acceptance grows, it faces increasing threats from attacks targeting these mechanisms, such as selfish mining, double-spending, and block withholding. These attacks compromise security, efficiency, and reward distribution. Recent research shows that these attacks can be combined with each other or with either malicious strategies, such as network-layer attacks, or non-malicious strategies, like honest mining. These combinations lead to more sophisticated attacks, increasing the attacker's success rates and profitability. Therefore, understanding and evaluating these attacks is essential for developing effective countermeasures and ensuring long-term security. This paper begins by examining individual attacks executed in isolation and their profitability. It then explores how combining these attacks with each other or with other malicious and non-malicious strategies can enhance their overall effectiveness and profitability. The analysis further explores how the deployment of attacks such as selfish mining and block withholding by multiple competing mining pools against each other impacts their economic returns. Lastly, a set of design guidelines is provided, outlining areas future work should focus on to prevent or mitigate the identified threats.