The museum pass problem with consortia

TL;DR

This paper extends the museum pass problem to include market structures with consortia, proposing four allocation mechanisms that satisfy fairness and stability properties, and characterizing them axiomatically.

Contribution

It introduces a novel extension of the museum pass problem by modeling market structures with consortia and develops four new allocation mechanisms with fairness and stability guarantees.

Findings

Four allocation mechanisms satisfying fairness and stability.

Axiomatic characterization of the proposed mechanisms.

Incorporation of market structure into the museum pass problem.

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the museum pass problem to incorporate the market structure. To be more precise, we consider that museums are organized into several pass programs or consortia. Within this framework, we propose four allocation mechanisms based on the market structure and the principles of proportionality and egalitarianism. All these mechanisms satisfy different reasonable properties related to fairness and stability which serve to axiomatically characterize them.