Seasonal social dilemmas

TL;DR

This paper models seasonal social dilemmas in epidemic contexts, showing how behavioral responses can influence infection peaks and emphasizing the importance of timing interventions for effective disease mitigation.

Contribution

It introduces a coupled game-theoretical and epidemiological model capturing seasonal social dilemmas and their impact on infection dynamics.

Findings

Social dilemmas recur annually with seasonal forcing.

Behavioral responses can either amplify or reduce infection peaks.

Timing of interventions is crucial for effective epidemic control.

Abstract

Social dilemmas where the good of a group is at odds with individual interests are usually considered as static -- the dilemma does not change over time. In the COVID-19 pandemic, social dilemmas occurred in the mitigation of epidemic spread: Should I reduce my contacts or wear a mask to protect others? In the context of respiratory diseases, which are predominantly spreading during the winter months, some of these situations re-occur seasonally. We couple a game theoretical model, where individuals can adjust their behavior, to an epidemiological model with seasonal forcing. We find that social dilemmas can occur annually and that behavioral reactions to them can either decrease or increase the peaks of infections in a population. Our work has not only implications for seasonal infectious diseases, but also more generally for oscillatory social dilemmas: A complex interdependence between behavior and external dynamics emerges. To be effective and to exploit behavioral dynamics, intervention measures to mitigate re-occuring social dilemmas have to be timed carefully.