Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds May Suffice

TL;DR

This paper proposes the VRP voting procedure, which efficiently identifies the Condorcet winner in a few rounds using random proposers, improving decision-making processes in various organizational contexts.

Contribution

The paper introduces the VRP method, demonstrating that it guarantees Condorcet winner implementation in a small number of rounds under certain preference conditions.

Findings

VRP guarantees Condorcet winner in few rounds with truthful voting.

Two rounds suffice under symmetric preferences or non-extreme status quo.

Applicable to committees, legislatures, and decentralized organizations.

Abstract

This paper introduces the Voting with Random Proposers (VRP) procedure to address the challenges of agenda manipulation in voting. In each round of VRP, a randomly selected proposer suggests an alternative that is voted on against the previous round's winner. In a framework with single-peaked preferences, we show that the VRP procedure guarantees that the Condorcet winner is implemented in a few rounds with truthful voting, and in just two rounds under sufficiently symmetric preference distributions or if status quo positions are not extreme. The results have applications for committee decisions, legislative decision-making, and the organization of citizens' assemblies and decentralized autonomous organizations.