An evolutionary game theory approach to modeling behavioral interaction in disclosing infection begins with an outbreak: COVID-19 as an example
Pranav Verma, Viney Kumar, Samit Bhattacharyya

TL;DR
This paper develops a game-theoretic model using fractional derivatives to analyze voluntary infection disclosure behaviors during COVID-19, highlighting how transmission rates and perceived severity influence quarantine decisions and disease spread.
Contribution
It introduces a novel fractional derivative-based game-theoretic model to study voluntary disclosure and quarantine behaviors during infectious outbreaks.
Findings
Higher transmission rates increase voluntary disclosure and quarantine.
Perceived severity influences the likelihood of infection disclosure.
Model fitted to Chilean COVID-19 hospitalization data.
Abstract
The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the livelihoods of people worldwide prompted the implementation of a range of preventive measures at local, national, and international levels. Early in the outbreak, before the vaccine became accessible, voluntary quarantine and social isolation emerged as crucial strategies to curb the spread of infection. In this research, we present a game-theoretic model to elucidate the voluntary disclosure of exposure to infected individuals within communities. By employing a fractional derivative approach to illustrate disease propagation within the compartmental model, we determine the minimum level of voluntary disclosure required to disrupt the chain of transmission and allow the epidemic to fade. Our findings suggest that higher transmission rates and increased perceived severity of infection change the externality of disclosing infected…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
