Chatting with Bots: AI, Speech Acts, and the Edge of Assertion

TL;DR

This paper explores whether large language model chatbots can genuinely assert, proposing the concept of proto-assertion to better understand their expressive capabilities and addressing philosophical debates about their assertive status.

Contribution

It introduces the novel concept of proto-assertion to analyze chatbot speech acts, offering a new philosophical framework to assess their assertion capabilities.

Findings

Chatbots can be considered proto-assertors rather than full assertors.

Existing objections to chatbot assertion are addressed through the proto-assertion framework.

The concept of proto-assertion helps reconcile the debate over chatbot assertion.

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of whether large language model-powered chatbots are capable of assertion. According to what we call the Thesis of Chatbot Assertion (TCA), chatbots are the kinds of things that can assert, and at least some of the output produced by current-generation chatbots qualifies as assertion. We provide some motivation for TCA, arguing that it ought to be taken seriously and not simply dismissed. We also review recent objections to TCA, arguing that these objections are weighty. We thus confront the following dilemma: how can we do justice to both the considerations for and against TCA? We consider two influential responses to this dilemma - the first appeals to the notion of proxy-assertion; the second appeals to fictionalism - and argue that neither is satisfactory. Instead, reflecting on the ontogenesis of assertion, we argue that we need to make space for a category of proto-assertion. We then apply the category of proto-assertion to chatbots, arguing that treating chatbots as proto-assertors provides a satisfactory resolution to the dilemma of chatbot assertion.