A Sequential Game Framework for Target Tracking
Daniel Leal, Ngoc Hung Nguyen, Alex Skvortsov, Sanjeev Arulampalam,, Mahendra Piraveenan

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic framework combined with Kalman filtering to improve maritime target tracking, demonstrating significant performance gains over traditional methods in various scenarios.
Contribution
It presents a novel sequential game model for tracking and evading, incorporating imperfect information and multi-faceted criteria, advancing decision-making in target tracking systems.
Findings
Game-theoretic decision making increases tracker win percentage.
Traditional covariance minimization is less effective than the proposed method.
Simple linear evasion strategies are most effective for evaders in most scenarios.
Abstract
This paper investigates the application of game-theoretic principles combined with advanced Kalman filtering techniques to enhance maritime target tracking systems. Specifically, the paper presents a two-player, imperfect information, non-cooperative, sequential game framework for optimal decision making for a tracker and an evader. The paper also investigates the effectiveness of this game-theoretic decision making framework by comparing it with single-objective optimisation methods based on minimising tracking uncertainty. Rather than modelling a zero-sum game between the tracker and the evader, which presupposes the availability of perfect information, in this paper we model both the tracker and the evader as playing separate zero-sum games at each time step with an internal (and imperfect) model of the other player. The study defines multi-faceted winning criteria for both tracker…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications
