Pricing Factors and TFMs for Scalability-Focused ZK-Rollups

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how transaction fee mechanisms can be designed for ZK-Rollups to improve scalability, considering factors like sequencing, data availability, and ZK proofs, and discusses their properties, trade-offs, and open questions.

Contribution

It introduces new considerations and proposals for transaction fee mechanisms tailored to ZK-Rollups, addressing their unique cost and incentive structures.

Findings

Proposed criteria for effective TFMs in ZK-Rollups

Identified trade-offs between incentive compatibility and profitability

Highlighted open research questions in TFM design for ZK-Rollups

Abstract

ZK-Rollups have emerged as a leading solution for blockchain scalability, leveraging succinct proofs primarily based on ZKP protocols. This paper explores the design of transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) for ZK-Rollups, focusing on how key components like sequencing, data availability~(DA), and ZK proving interact to influence cost structures. We outline the properties that a suitable TFM should possess, such as incentive compatibility and net profitability. In addition, we propose alternatives for TFMs, discuss trade-offs, and highlight open questions that require further investigation in the context of ZK-Rollups.