Large Language Models and the Rationalist Empiricist Debate
David King

TL;DR
This paper examines the debate between rationalism and empiricism in the context of large language models, arguing that LLMs do not provide evidence for or against human learning being empiricist, due to fundamental differences in learning processes.
Contribution
It clarifies the relevance of LLMs to the rationalist empiricist debate, emphasizing differences in learning mechanisms between humans and models and challenging claims of LLMs vindicating rationalism.
Findings
LLMs require rich stimuli, unlike humans who learn with limited input.
Externalized empiricism can accommodate innate biases if empirically determined.
Differences in learning processes suggest LLMs are not indicative of human learning modes.
Abstract
To many Chomsky's debates with Quine and Skinner are an updated version of the Rationalist Empiricist debates of the 17th century. The consensus being that Chomsky's Rationalism was victorious. This dispute has reemerged with the advent of Large Language Models. With some arguing that LLMs vindicate rationalism because of the necessity of building in innate biases to make them work. The necessity of building in innate biases is taken to prove that empiricism hasn't got the conceptual resources to explain linguistic competence. Such claims depend on the nature of the empiricism one is endorsing. Externalized Empiricism has no difficulties with innate apparatus once they are determined empirically (Quine 1969). Thus, externalized empiricism is not refuted because of the need to build in innate biases in LLMs. Furthermore, the relevance of LLMs to the rationalist empiricist debate in…
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Taxonomy
TopicsTopic Modeling
