Exploring Power Side-Channel Challenges in Embedded Systems Security

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the challenges of power side-channel attacks in embedded systems and proposes a novel signal-processing method that enables effective attacks without hardware modifications, validated on real devices.

Contribution

It introduces a new signal-processing approach that overcomes noise and hardware constraints, expanding PSC attack applicability in embedded security.

Findings

Effective PSC attacks on real-world devices demonstrated

Method reduces hardware requirements for successful attacks

Potential to broaden embedded systems security assessments

Abstract

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in the embedded systems domain faces significant challenges. These include the need for specialized hardware setups to manage high noise levels in real-world targets and assumptions regarding the attacker's knowledge and capabilities. This paper systematically analyzes these challenges and introduces a novel signal-processing method that addresses key limitations, enabling effective PSC attacks in real-world embedded systems without requiring hardware modifications. We validate the proposed approach through experiments on real-world black-box embedded devices, verifying its potential to expand its usage in various embedded systems security applications beyond traditional cryptographic applications.