Multi-round jailbreak attack on large language models
Yihua Zhou, Xiaochuan Shi

TL;DR
This paper presents a multi-round jailbreak attack method that decomposes dangerous prompts into sub-questions to bypass safety filters in large language models, revealing vulnerabilities in static rule-based defenses.
Contribution
It introduces a novel multi-round decomposition approach for jailbreak attacks, significantly improving success rates against LLM safety measures.
Findings
Achieved 94% success rate on Llama2-7B.
Effectively bypassed static rule-based filters.
Demonstrated vulnerability of current safety mechanisms.
Abstract
Ensuring the safety and alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is crucial for generating responses that are beneficial to humanity. While LLMs have the capability to identify and avoid harmful queries, they remain vulnerable to "jailbreak" attacks, where carefully crafted prompts can induce the generation of toxic content. Traditional single-round jailbreak attacks, such as GCG and AutoDAN, do not alter the sensitive words in the dangerous prompts. Although they can temporarily bypass the model's safeguards through prompt engineering, their success rate drops significantly as the LLM is further fine-tuned, and they cannot effectively circumvent static rule-based filters that remove the hazardous vocabulary. In this study, to better understand jailbreak attacks, we introduce a multi-round jailbreak approach. This method can rewrite the dangerous prompts,…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Network Security and Intrusion Detection · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
MethodsSparse Evolutionary Training
