Strategic and Fair Aggregator Interactions in Energy Markets: Mutli-agent Dynamics and Quasiconcave Games

TL;DR

This paper models the strategic interactions among multiple energy aggregators in electricity markets as a quasiconcave game, establishing the existence of Nash equilibria and demonstrating how these interactions promote fairness and efficiency.

Contribution

It extends fair energy resource allocation to a multi-agent setting, proving quasiconcavity of aggregator strategies and analyzing equilibrium properties.

Findings

Existence of Nash equilibrium in multi-aggregator energy markets

Aggregators stabilize market outcomes and promote fair resource distribution

Simulation results confirm strategic stability and efficiency improvements

Abstract

The introduction of aggregator structures has proven effective in bringing fairness to energy resource allocation by negotiating for more resources and economic surplus on behalf of users. This paper extends the fair energy resource allocation problem to a multi-agent setting, focusing on interactions among multiple aggregators in an electricity market. We prove that the strategic optimization problems faced by the aggregators form a quasiconcave game, ensuring the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This resolves complexities related to market price dependencies on total purchases and balancing fairness and efficiency in energy allocation. In addition, we design simulations to characterize the equilibrium points of the induced game, demonstrating how aggregators stabilize market outcomes, ensure fair resource distribution, and optimize user surplus. Our findings offer a robust framework for understanding strategic interactions among aggregators, contributing to more efficient and equitable energy markets.