Cooperate or Compete: Coalition Formation in Congestion Games

TL;DR

This paper explores how coalition formation and cooperation among agents can reduce congestion and improve outcomes in shared resource scenarios, considering the complex interplay of arrangements and multiple Nash equilibria.

Contribution

It introduces a novel model of coalition formation in congestion games where coalition worth depends on opponents' arrangements and analyzes stability and equilibrium properties.

Findings

Coalitions can effectively reduce congestion losses through coordination.

The worth of a coalition depends on the arrangement of opponents, affecting stability.

Multiple Nash equilibria exist for each coalition arrangement, influencing coalition stability.

Abstract

This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the cooperating group (a.k.a., coalition) can minimize the congestion losses due to inmates, while efficiently facing the competition from outsiders (coalitions indulge in a non-cooperative congestion game). The quest in this paper is to identify the stable partition of coalitions that are not challenged by a new coalition. In contrast to the traditional cooperative games, the worth of a coalition in our game also depends upon the arrangement of the opponents. Every arrangement leads to a partition and a corresponding congestion game; the resultant Nash equilibria (NEs) dictate the `worth'. The analysis is further complicated due to the presence of multiple NEs for each such game.