How hard can it be? Quantifying MITRE attack campaigns with attack trees and cATM logic
Stefano M. Nicoletti, Milan Lopuha\"a-Zwakenberg, Mari\"elle Stoelinga, Fabio Massacci, Carlos E. Budde

TL;DR
This paper presents a data-driven framework using attack trees and cATM logic to quantify and compare the likelihood of cyber attack campaigns from the MITRE database, aiding cybersecurity decision-making.
Contribution
It introduces a novel, automated methodology for modeling attack campaigns with attack trees and cATM logic, reducing effort and improving quantitative comparison capabilities.
Findings
Quantified likelihood of all MITRE Enterprise campaigns.
Compared likelihood of Wocao and Dream Job campaigns.
Demonstrated lighter modeling effort with the proposed approach.
Abstract
The landscape of cyber threats grows more complex by the day. Advanced Persistent Threats carry out attack campaigns - e.g. operations Dream Job, Wocao, and WannaCry - against which cybersecurity practitioners must defend. To prioritise which of these to defend against, cybersecurity experts must be equipped with the right toolbox to evaluate the most threatening ones. In particular, they would strongly benefit from (a) an estimation of the likelihood values for each attack recorded in the wild, and (b) transparently operationalising these values to compare campaigns quantitatively. Security experts could then perform transparent and accountable quantitatively-informed decisions. Here we construct such a framework: (1) quantifying the likelihood of attack campaigns via data-driven procedures on the MITRE knowledge-base, (2) introducing a methodology for automatic modelling of MITRE…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
