The Cyber Alliance Game: How Alliances Influence Cyber-Warfare
Gergely Benk\H{o}, Gergely Bicz\'ok

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic model to analyze how alliances influence cyber-warfare strategies, focusing on vulnerability sharing, internal power dynamics, and alliance incentives in cyber conflicts.
Contribution
It presents a novel Cyber Alliance Game framework that examines alliance effects on cyber conflict decisions, including sharing incentives and internal power structures.
Findings
Vulnerability-sharing rewards significantly affect equilibrium outcomes.
Internal power structures influence member behavior and conflict results.
Alliances can steer member actions through rewards and punishments.
Abstract
Cyber-warfare has become the norm in current ongoing military conflicts. Over the past decade, numerous examples have shown the extent to which nation-states become vulnerable if they do not focus on building their cyber capacities. Adding to the inherent complexity of cyberwar scenarios, a state is usually a member of one or more alliances. Alliance policies and internal struggles could shape the individual actions of member states; intuitively, this also holds for the cyber domain. In this paper, we define and study a simple Cyber Alliance Game with the objective of understanding the fundamental influence of alliances on cyber conflicts between nation-states. Specifically, we focus on the decision of whether to exploit a newly found vulnerability individually or share it with the alliance. First, we characterize the impact of vulnerability-sharing rewards on the resulting…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies · Information and Cyber Security
