What is a physical theory? Philosophers do have an answer by distinguishing two forms of empirical adequacy

TL;DR

The paper explores the concept of physical theories, arguing that a proper definition involves commitments aligned with scientific realism, particularly emphasizing non-factive empirical adequacy to resolve foundational issues.

Contribution

It clarifies the role of non-factive versus factive empirical adequacy in defining physical theories and demonstrates this distinction's importance through a physics case study.

Findings

Non-factive empirical adequacy aligns with scientific realism.

Factive empirical adequacy is associated with factual correctness.

Using non-factive adequacy resolves a foundational problem in physics.

Abstract

What is a physical theory? Although this intriguing question has been addressed from many different perspectives, some physicists and philosophers of physics have implicitly or explicitly embraced a philosophically-neutral definition of a physical theory, independently of the philosophical position endorsed with respect to it. Considering some objections against this view, I shall argue that the most appropriate definition of a physical theory already presupposes some commitments shared by a philosophical position associated with scientific realism. As we shall see, what physical theories and scientific realist positions have in common is the commitment of satisfying a non-factive notion of empirical adequacy, whilst a factive notion of empirical adequacy shall be solely associated with scientific realism. Based on this factive/non-factive distinction, we shall finally present a case study in physics in order to show that a well-known foundational problem associated with the concept of manifest time can be dissolved once the non-factive notion of empirical adequacy (as opposed to factive one) is endorsed.