
TL;DR
This paper develops quasipolynomial-time algorithms for computing the most equitable voting rules that satisfy fairness axioms, connecting the problem to graph isomorphism and automorphism complexities, and establishing new computational hardness results.
Contribution
It introduces efficient algorithms for fairness-preserving voting rules and links their complexity to graph isomorphism, providing the first GI/GA-complete results in computational social choice.
Findings
Quasipolynomial algorithms for equitable voting rules
Verification of fairness axioms is GI-complete
Tie-breaking method preserves fairness properties
Abstract
How to design fair and (computationally) efficient voting rules is a central challenge in Computational Social Choice. In this paper, we aim at designing efficient algorithms for computing most equitable rules for large classes of preferences and decisions, which optimally satisfy two fundamental fairness/equity axioms: anonymity (every voter being treated equally) and neutrality (every alternative being treated equally). By revealing a natural connection to the graph isomorphism problem and leveraging recent breakthroughs by Babai [2019], we design quasipolynomial-time algorithms that compute most equitable rules with verifications, which also compute verifications about whether anonymity and neutrality are satisfied at the input profile. Further extending this approach, we propose the canonical-labeling tie-breaking, which runs in quasipolynomial-time and optimally breaks ties to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
