Exploiting HDMI and USB Ports for GPU Side-Channel Insights

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel passive side-channel attack exploiting power consumption patterns at USB and HDMI ports to infer GPU activities, highlighting security vulnerabilities in common external ports.

Contribution

It presents a new attack method using a custom device to monitor power patterns at ports, revealing GPU activities without triggering security alerts.

Findings

Successful inference of GPU processes like neural network computations

Demonstration of discreet, non-intrusive power measurement device

Highlighting vulnerabilities in existing port security measures

Abstract

Modern computers rely on USB and HDMI ports for connecting external peripherals and display devices. Despite their built-in security measures, these ports remain susceptible to passive power-based side-channel attacks. This paper presents a new class of attacks that exploit power consumption patterns at these ports to infer GPU activities. We develop a custom device that plugs into these ports and demonstrate that its high-resolution power measurements can drive successful inferences about GPU processes, such as neural network computations and video rendering. The ubiquitous presence of USB and HDMI ports allows for discreet placement of the device, and its non-interference with data channels ensures that no security alerts are triggered. Our findings underscore the need to reevaluate and strengthen the current generation of HDMI and USB port security defenses.