Separating minimal from radical embodied cognitive neuroscience

TL;DR

This paper discusses the distinction between minimal and radical embodiment in cognitive neuroscience, emphasizing that minimal embodiment remains neurocentric and limits understanding of neural contributions to cognition within organism-environment interactions.

Contribution

It clarifies the important differences between minimal and radical embodiment, advocating for a more comprehensive embodied approach beyond neurocentric perspectives.

Findings

Minimal embodiment remains neurocentric and limited.

Radical embodiment offers a broader understanding of organism-environment dynamics.

Current work underemphasizes distinctions between embodiment types.

Abstract

Mougenot and Matheson (2024) make a compelling case for the development of a mechanistic cognitive neuroscience that is embodied. However, their analysis of extant work under this header plays down important distinctions between "minimal" and "radical" embodiment. The former remains firmly neurocentric and therefore has limited potential to move the needle in understanding the functional contributions of neural dynamics to cognition in the context of wider organism-environment dynamics.