The Value of Compromising Strategic Intent in General Lotto Games

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how partial information about an opponent's strategy in General Lotto games can be exploited by a player to improve their outcomes, revealing the strategic value of compromising intent in resource allocation conflicts.

Contribution

It introduces a model where one player has partial binary information about the opponent's resources and characterizes equilibrium strategies and payoffs under this setting.

Findings

Sensor information significantly improves the Breaker's performance.

Equilibrium strategies are characterized under partial information.

Numerical studies validate the strategic advantage of compromising intent.

Abstract

Resource allocation in adversarial environments is a fundamental challenge across various domains, from corporate competition to military strategy. This article examines the impact of compromising an opponent's strategic intent in the context of General Lotto games, a class of resource allocation problems. We consider a scenario where one player, termed the "Breaker", has access to partial information about their opponent's strategy through a binary sensor. This sensor reveals whether the opponent's allocated resources exceed a certain threshold. Our analysis provides a comprehensive characterization of equilibrium strategies and payoffs for both players under this information structure. Through numerical studies, we demonstrate that the information provided by the sensor can significantly improve the Breaker's performance.