The Sensitivity of the U.S. Presidential Election to Coordinated Voter Relocation
Carlos Cardonha, David Bergman, Andre Cire, Leonardo Lozano, Tallys, Yunes

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that a small, coordinated movement of voters across state lines can significantly influence U.S. presidential election outcomes, revealing a vulnerability in the electoral system.
Contribution
It introduces a novel analysis showing how minimal, strategic voter relocations can alter election results, highlighting a previously underexplored vulnerability.
Findings
A 1% chance of winning can be increased by relocating 10,000 voters within 100 miles.
An 8% probability boost is possible with 50,000 voters crossing state lines.
Relocation can be achieved with minimal logistical challenges and short timeframes.
Abstract
U.S. presidential elections are decided by the Electoral College, established in 1789, and designed to mitigate potential risks arising from the collusion of large groups of citizens. A statewide winner-take-all popular voting system for electors is implemented in all but two states, which has led to instances where narrow victories in key states were decisive in several recent elections. Small groups of voters can significantly impact the election, for example, through voter turnout. However, another dynamic can also influence this: a surprisingly small number of dedicated voters moving short distances across state lines. The extent to which the election's outcome is sensitive to small and well-coordinated movements of people has not been investigated in detail. Using a combination of forecasting, simulation, and optimization, we show that a candidate's probability of winning can be…
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Taxonomy
TopicsElectoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
