Infighting in the Dark: Multi-Label Backdoor Attack in Federated Learning

TL;DR

This paper introduces Mirage, a novel non-cooperative multi-label backdoor attack in federated learning, demonstrating its effectiveness in injecting persistent backdoors without collusion, surpassing existing methods and bypassing defenses.

Contribution

The paper presents the first non-cooperative MBA strategy in FL, addressing inherent constraints and constructing in-distribution backdoor mappings to enhance attack success.

Findings

Mirage achieves over 97% attack success rate.

It maintains over 90% effectiveness after 900 rounds.

Outperforms existing attack methods and bypasses defenses.

Abstract

Federated Learning (FL), a privacy-preserving decentralized machine learning framework, has been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Current research primarily focuses on the Single-Label Backdoor Attack (SBA), wherein adversaries share a consistent target. However, a critical fact is overlooked: adversaries may be non-cooperative, have distinct targets, and operate independently, which exhibits a more practical scenario called Multi-Label Backdoor Attack (MBA). Unfortunately, prior works are ineffective in the MBA scenario since non-cooperative attackers exclude each other. In this work, we conduct an in-depth investigation to uncover the inherent constraints of the exclusion: similar backdoor mappings are constructed for different targets, resulting in conflicts among backdoor functions. To address this limitation, we propose Mirage, the first non-cooperative MBA strategy in FL that allows attackers to inject effective and persistent backdoors into the global model without collusion by constructing in-distribution (ID) backdoor mapping. Specifically, we introduce an adversarial adaptation method to bridge the backdoor features and the target distribution in an ID manner. Additionally, we further leverage a constrained optimization method to ensure the ID mapping survives in the global training dynamics. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that Mirage outperforms various state-of-the-art attacks and bypasses existing defenses, achieving an average ASR greater than 97\% and maintaining over 90\% after 900 rounds. This work aims to alert researchers to this potential threat and inspire the design of effective defense mechanisms. Code has been made open-source.