MoJE: Mixture of Jailbreak Experts, Naive Tabular Classifiers as Guard for Prompt Attacks
Giandomenico Cornacchia, Giulio Zizzo, Kieran Fraser, Muhammad Zaid, Hameed, Ambrish Rawat, Mark Purcell

TL;DR
This paper introduces MoJE, a new guardrail architecture that effectively detects jailbreak attacks on LLMs with high accuracy and low computational cost, improving security without sacrificing benign prompt performance.
Contribution
MoJE is a novel mixture of experts guardrail that outperforms existing methods in detecting jailbreak attacks efficiently using simple linguistic techniques.
Findings
Detects 90% of jailbreak attacks
Maintains low computational overhead
Preserves benign prompt integrity
Abstract
The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) in diverse applications underscores the pressing need for robust security measures to thwart potential jailbreak attacks. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities within LLMs, endanger data integrity and user privacy. Guardrails serve as crucial protective mechanisms against such threats, but existing models often fall short in terms of both detection accuracy, and computational efficiency. This paper advocates for the significance of jailbreak attack prevention on LLMs, and emphasises the role of input guardrails in safeguarding these models. We introduce MoJE (Mixture of Jailbreak Expert), a novel guardrail architecture designed to surpass current limitations in existing state-of-the-art guardrails. By employing simple linguistic statistical techniques, MoJE excels in detecting jailbreak attacks while maintaining minimal computational…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Malware Detection Techniques · Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies · Digital and Cyber Forensics
