Condorcet cycle elections with influential voting blocs
Gabriel Gendler

TL;DR
This paper explores Condorcet cycle elections with influential voting blocs, introducing a relaxed anonymity condition called transitive anonymity, and shows that non-Borda elections can exist under this condition, especially when voter numbers are not multiples of three.
Contribution
It introduces transitive anonymity as a new condition in voting theory and demonstrates the existence of non-Borda elections under this condition, extending previous results.
Findings
Non-Borda elections exist under transitive anonymity.
Non-Borda elections occur when voter count is not divisible by three.
Even non-Borda elections are close to Borda under certain conditions.
Abstract
A Condorcet cycle election is an election (often called a Social Welfare Function, or SWF) between three candidates, where each voter ranks the three candidates according to a fixed cyclic order. Maskin showed that if such a SWF obeys the MIIA condition, and respects the complete anonymity of each voter, then it must be a Borda election, where each voter assigns two points to their preferred candidate, one to their second preference and none to their least preferred candidate. We introduce a relaxed anonymity condition called ``transitive anonymity'', whereby a group acting transitively on the set of voters maintains the outcome of the SWF. Elections across multiple constituencies of equal size are common examples of elections with transitive anonymity but without full anonymity. First, we demonstrate that under this relaxed anonymity condition, non-Borda elections do exist.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
