Confidence in Assurance 2.0 Cases

TL;DR

This paper explores a comprehensive approach called Assurance 2.0 to assess and enhance confidence in critical system claims through logical, probabilistic, dialectical, and risk-based perspectives.

Contribution

It introduces a multi-faceted framework for assessing confidence in assurance cases, integrating logical, probabilistic, dialectical, and residual risk analyses.

Findings

Framework provides a structured way to evaluate confidence.

Combines multiple perspectives for robust assurance.

Aims for indefeasible confidence in system claims.

Abstract

An assurance case should provide justifiable confidence in the truth of a claim about some critical property of a system or procedure, such as safety or security. We consider how confidence can be assessed in the rigorous approach we call Assurance 2.0. Our goal is indefeasible confidence and we approach it from four different perspectives: logical soundness, probabilistic assessment, dialectical examination, and residual risks.