Revisiting Physical-World Adversarial Attack on Traffic Sign Recognition: A Commercial Systems Perspective
Ningfei Wang, Shaoyuan Xie, Takami Sato, Yunpeng Luo, Kaidi Xu, Qi, Alfred Chen

TL;DR
This study evaluates the effectiveness of physical-world adversarial attacks on commercial Traffic Sign Recognition systems, revealing their variable success rates and the influence of system design features like spatial memorization.
Contribution
It provides the first large-scale measurement of such attacks on real-world commercial TSR systems and introduces new metrics to better understand attack success factors.
Findings
High attack success (100%) on some commercial systems
Lower overall success rates due to system design factors
Seven novel insights challenging prior assumptions
Abstract
Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) is crucial for safe and correct driving automation. Recent works revealed a general vulnerability of TSR models to physical-world adversarial attacks, which can be low-cost, highly deployable, and capable of causing severe attack effects such as hiding a critical traffic sign or spoofing a fake one. However, so far existing works generally only considered evaluating the attack effects on academic TSR models, leaving the impacts of such attacks on real-world commercial TSR systems largely unclear. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale measurement of physical-world adversarial attacks against commercial TSR systems. Our testing results reveal that it is possible for existing attack works from academia to have highly reliable (100\%) attack success against certain commercial TSR system functionality, but such attack capabilities are not…
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