A Novel Voting System for Medical Catalogues in National Health Insurance
Xingyuan Liang, Haibao Wen

TL;DR
This paper proposes a new voting system for medical insurance catalogues that enhances transparency and stakeholder consensus, using simulations and theoretical models to improve healthcare decision-making.
Contribution
It introduces a novel voting model for medical catalogues incorporating blockchain and incentive mechanisms, advancing transparency and stakeholder engagement.
Findings
Monte Carlo simulations show robust consensus on treatments
Theoretical models suggest patient outcome incentives improve decisions
Potential blockchain integration ensures transparency and integrity
Abstract
This study explores the conceptual development of a medical insurance catalogue voting system. The methodology is centred on creating a model where doctors would vote on treatment inclusions, aiming to demonstrate transparency and integrity. The results from Monte Carlo simulations suggest a robust consensus on the selection of medicines and treatments. Further theoretical investigations propose incorporating a patient outcome-based incentive mechanism. This conceptual approach could enhance decision-making in healthcare by aligning stakeholder interests with patient outcomes, aiming for an optimised, equitable insurance catalogue with potential blockchain-based smart-contracts to ensure transparency and integrity.
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Taxonomy
TopicsArtificial Intelligence in Law · Healthcare Policy and Management
