Adaptation Procedure in Misinformation Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces misinformation games to model misinformed agents in multi-agent systems and proposes an iterative adaptation procedure for agents to update their beliefs and strategies over time.

Contribution

It develops a new game-theoretic framework for misinformation and introduces the Adaptation Procedure to analyze iterative belief updates in such settings.

Findings

The Adaptation Procedure effectively models how agents revise beliefs over time.

Misinformation games provide a novel framework for studying misinformed agent interactions.

Implementation results show the procedure's impact on strategic behavior and efficiency.

Abstract

We study interactions between agents in multi-agent systems, in which the agents are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having a subjective and incorrect understanding of the setting, without being aware of it. For that, we introduce a new game-theoretic concept, called misinformation games, that provides the necessary toolkit to study this situation. Subsequently, we enhance this framework by developing a time-discrete procedure (called the Adaptation Procedure) that captures iterative interactions in the above context. During the Adaptation Procedure, the agents update their information and reassess their behaviour in each step. We demonstrate our ideas through an implementation, which is used to study the efficiency and characteristics of the Adaptation Procedure.